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ABSTRACT 
 
Nondescript: A Web Tool to Aid Subversion of Authorship Attribution 
 
by 
 
Robin Davis 
 
 
 
Advisor: Dr. William Sakas 
 
 
 
A person’s writing style is uniquely quantifiable and can serve reliably as a biometric. A writer who 
wishes to remain anonymous can use a number of privacy technologies but can still be identified 
simply by the words they choose to use — how frequently they use common words like “of,” for 
instance. Nondescript is a web tool designed first to identify the user’s writing style in terms of word 
frequency from a given writing sample and document, then to suggest how the author can change 
their document to lessen its probability of being attributed to them. While Nondescript does not 
guarantee anonymity, the web tool provides a user with an iterative interface to revise their writing 
and see results of a simulated authorship attribution scenario. Nondescript also provides a synonym-
replacement feature, which significantly lowers the probability that a document will be attributed to 
the original author. 
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Nondescript: A Web Tool to Aid Subversion of Authorship Attribution 
 
by 
 
Robin Davis 
 
 
 
 
By the use of the spectroscope, a beam of non-homogeneous light is analyzed, and its components assorted according to 
their wavelength. As it is well-known, each element, when intensely heated under proper conditions, sends forth light 
which, upon prismatic analysis, is found to consist of groups of waves of definite length, and appearing in certain 
definite proportions. So certain and uniform are the results of this analysis, that the appearance of a particular spectrum 
is indisputable evidence of the presence of the element to which it belongs.  
In a matter very similar, it is proposed to analyze a composition by forming what may be called a ‘word-
spectrum,’ or a ‘characteristic curve,’ which shall be a graphic arrangement of words according to their length and to the 
relative frequency of their occurrence. If, now, it shall be found that with every author, as with every element, this 
spectrum persists in its form and appearance, the value of the method will be at once conceded. 
(Mendenhall, 1887) 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
1.1 The his tory o f  authorship at tr ibut ion  
 Authorship attribution using 
computational methods has a long and successful 
history. In general, the goal of statistical 
authorship attribution is to ascertain who wrote a 
given anonymous document, using data from a 
number of documents that have known authors, 
with the assumption that the anonymous author is 
among them.  
 Mendenhall (1887) published a paper in Science 
about his intuition that authors each had a uniquely 
identifiable “word-spectrum.” In a small attempt to prove it, he chose 10,000-word passages from 
Charles Dickens and William Thackeray, among others, and counted the occurrences of words 
Graph of an analysis of passages from two Dickens texts 
from Mendenhall (1887). X-axis represents word-length (1-
letter words, 2-letter words, etc.); y-axis represents count in 
the passage of text. 
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according to their length in characters in each passage, graphing the results (one example above). 
With his limited and laborious method, Mendenhall concluded that authors’ “character curves” 
would be a fruitful pursuit, though he suspected that several hundred thousand words per author 
would be required to plot them accurately. In 1901, he followed through with notion with the paid 
assistance of “Mrs. Richard Mitchell and Miss Amy C. Whitman, of Worcester, Massachusetts,” 
comparing millions of words of Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, Christopher Marlowe, and others, 
producing interesting graphs that questioned or proved the authorship assumptions of the day.  
Ultimately, Mendenhall’s underlying intuition that authors have a unique “word-spectrum” is 
correct, though word-length alone proves not to be a reliable indicator of authorship. A much more 
laborious method, counting the words themselves, was undertaken decades later by Mosteller and 
Wallace (1963), who wrote the first landmark paper in statistical authorship attribution that 
considered the frequency distributions of words themselves. The authors posited that James 
Madison wrote the 12 Federalist papers that were historically in dispute, rather than Alexander 
Hamilton, based on a Bayesian analysis of the frequency distributions of 165 words across the 
disputed papers and known works by Madison and Hamilton. The heavy reliance on function words 
like an, by, and from was counterintuitive and quite unlike the traditional historical research methods 
that focused on close reading — but the results were promising.  
In the intervening years, greater computational power lessened the labor of word-counting 
endeavors. And with the web, more text than ever became programmatically accessible. An 
abundance of web text — emails, blog posts, web pages — led to the burgeoning field of natural 
language processing, of which one branch remained authorship attribution (Stamatatos, 2009). Just 
as the Federalist Papers became a “classic” dataset for many published authorship attribution 
endeavors, so did the 2002 Enron email corpus, a set of real emails sent within the corporation that 
had entered the public domain during the Enron investigation. Public email lists (listservs), web 
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forums, and blogs were also prime source data for language and authorship studies. Based on this 
abundance of data, features in addition to word frequency could be used to fine-tune authorship 
attribution algorithms. These features range from the generic, such as sentence length and word 
length (in a neat return to Mendenhall [1887, 1901]), to the more granular, such as email signatures 
and frequent spelling errors (Iqbal, Binsalleeh, Fung, & Debbabi, 2010). Abbasi and Chen (2008) 
devised a technique called Writeprints that uses hundreds of feature sets in textual analysis with a 
very high rate of attribution accuracy. The use of these kinds of feature sets is often termed stylometry, 
as they measure an author’s style. 
As feature sets multiplied, so did the models in which they were employed to determine 
authorship. Probabilistic models are commonly used to predict the author of a given text, as 
Mosteller and Wallace (1963) did and as contemporary classifiers, such as Naïve Bayes, do now. 
These predictive models use supervised machine learning to classify texts: after being trained on 
documents with known authors, the classifier can then be used on documents with unknown 
authors to predict authorship based on the chosen features. For a discussion of other models, see 
Stamatatos (2009). 
 
1.2 The word-spec trum as a biometr i c  
With many feature set options and a high potential rate of accuracy, authorship attribution 
techniques can reliably identify the author of a document, assuming other documents of theirs are 
available for comparison. A person’s writing style is computationally uniquely identifiable. Given 
enough information, and in the right contexts, an individual’s writing style can be considered a 
behavioral biometric. Combine the power of authorship attribution with the massive amounts of 
text each web user now produces, and it becomes easy to see that this particular biometric could be 
harnessed to great effect in identifying authors on the web. Uses of this technology are manifold.  
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Criminal and forensic investigations use authorship attribution methods when scrutinizing 
suspicious messages or trying to match online and offline identities. The FBI’s State-of-the-Art 
Biometric Excellence Roadmap specifically noted this goal in 2009: “Currently, there are some 
studies in the area of writer’s colloquial analysis that may lead to the emerging technology of writer 
identification in the ‘blogosphere.’ These technologies could possibly create a profile and even 
identify a writer’s identity. … Recommend investment in scientifically-based text-independent e-mail 
and blog writer identification and document linking” (Wayman et al., 2009). While it is not clear 
whether the Biometric Center of Excellence followed up on this recommendation, it is interesting to 
note that this objective was listed alongside those related to face, iris, and voice recognition, 
suggesting that the FBI is using stylometry as a biometric. Another investigation of stylometry as 
biometric is the Writeprints technique (Abbasi & Chen, 2008), which emerged from the Dark Web 
project at the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. According to its website, the 
Dark Web project’s stated goal is “to study and understand the international terrorism (Jihadist) 
phenomena via a computational, data-centric approach” (n.d.). More recently, the CIA invested in 
tech companies that mine and analyze social media (Fang, 2016; “CIA Invests In Social Media 
Monitoring Technology…” 2009). Predictive threat modeling is a common and important part of 
antiterrorism work, and the massive amounts of data now available on the web makes building and 
training models easier for intelligence gathering.  
Like other biometrics, authorship attribution can serve as a security measure, too. One 
DARPA project focuses on active authentication, a security technique that relies not a password to 
access a computer, but on continuously monitoring the behavior of the user to ensure it lines up 
with their stored profile (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, n.d.). The user’s profile may 
include mouse behavior and “how the user crafts written language in an e-mail or document.” In a 
similar vein, Juola et al. (2013) pursued stylometric active authentication, with lukewarm results.  
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While stylometry began in the realm of literature and history, its usefulness as a biometric 
has emerged in the fields of intelligence and security. Stylometric analysis is a powerful tool with 
results that can have broad implications.  
 
1.3 Anonymity and wri t ing s ty le  
Personal identifiers like addresses and Social Security numbers are closely guarded by 
individuals to ensure that they are in control of this data and they know and trust who has it. Other 
kinds of information, like public tweets or online articles posted under their name, may not seem to 
pose an identity threat to the author piecemeal. But if enough public writing is gathered into a 
corpus, the corpus could model a person’s writing style and become personally identifiable 
information. If that person chose to write something anonymously — a common occurrence on the 
web, for a variety of reasons — their public writing corpus could out them as the author, thanks to 
advances in authorship attribution techniques.  
In the hands of powerful agents, the capability to identify authors on the web may not be 
wielded responsibly, just as access to users’ web data has not been used responsibly in recent years 
by world governments, including the United States. The US National Security Agency’s widespread 
surveillance program leaked in 2013 by Edward Snowden was shocking to many, because the NSA 
was collecting data on citizens and foreigners without their consent or knowledge. One program in 
particular, PRISM, was designed to mine data about people overseas from sites like Google and 
Facebook (Wyatt & Baker, 2013). The leaks set off an international public discussion about privacy, 
particularly how to maintain individual privacy on the internet. Privacy tools like PGP and Tor had 
been established for a while within information security circles, but were suddenly mentioned on 
general news sites and brought to public attention. Consumers asked for transparency reports from 
companies implicated in the leak. It became more apparent that a person’s behavioral patterns 
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online are linked to their identity and that communications can no longer be assumed to be viewed 
only by sender and recipient.  
There are important and legitimate reasons a person may want to publish something 
anonymously. A whistleblower may want to reveal corporate wrongdoing without putting their 
personal safety at risk, for instance. Or activists working in countries with oppressive governments 
may want to share information without risking their lives or the lives of their families. Or, as in the 
case of the renowned author J.K. Rowling, a writer may simply want to try publishing a novel in a 
different genre under a pen name to avoid risking their reputation. Of course, as law enforcement 
has pointed out, anonymity is a tool used for malevolent reasons as well. Criminals do not want their 
wrongdoing traced back to them. Still, tools to preserve privacy and allow anonymity must remain 
available for the sake of legitimate reasons, some of which may save lives.  
 If a person wanted to send an anonymous message — say, the whistleblower reporting 
corporate wrongdoing — they would likely turn to privacy technologies that would mask their 
location. They might use a public computer and set up an account unconnected to any other 
identifying profile they might have. But even if they were to use a number of technologies to 
anonymize the source of their message, and even if they withheld any other identifiable information 
within their message, their own writing style may give them away. An adversary need only collect the 
message in question and writing samples from those under suspicion (which is easy to compile if 
they posted things on the web, or if the adversary has emails from them). Using the feature selection 
and classification methods detailed above, an anonymous message could be pegged as having been 
written by the whistleblower.   
How can one avoid authorship attribution, given one’s public writing corpus and the 
advanced authorship attribution technology now available and in use? In other words, how can one 
deceive a classifier? 
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2. Related work  
Deceiving a classifier through machine translation of a document to and from a foreign 
language may have once been an obvious and easy route: simply run the document in question 
through an English to German translator and then through a German to English translator, for 
instance; the word choices would have changed but the meaning kept essentially the same. However, 
Caliskan & Greenstadt (2012) showed that classifiers can still correctly classify translated documents 
over 77% of the time.  
Deceiving a classifier through impersonation is much more successful. Brennan, Afroz, & 
Greenstadt (2012) found that asking study participants to impersonate the writing style of someone 
else led to successful attribution obfuscation 67% of the time. Participants provided a sample of 
their regular writing as well. This method works very well, but is laborious on the part of the writer. 
Deceiving a classifier through a guided, semi-automated anonymization program was even 
more successful. Anonymouth, from McDonald, Afroz, Caliskan, Stolerman, & Greenstadt (2012), 
is a downloadable, Java-based graphical user interface which prompts users to input a writing 
sample, the writings of three other authors, and finally the message they want to anonymize. 
Anonymouth analyzes and classifies the documents, then guides the user through suggestions of 
how to make their message anonymous (e.g., “Replace some single use words with less than three 
syllables with words that have already been used and have three or more syllables”). In their small 
study, McDonald et al. found that 80% of participants could successfully anonymize their document. 
But using the program requires downloading the source files, compiling the program in a Java IDE, 
and providing a background corpus — a laborious process. As of this writing, the program has not 
been updated since 2013.  
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All three of the above research projects were undertaken at the Privacy, Security, and 
Automation Laboratory at Drexel University.  
 
3.  Nondescript 
3.1 Descr ipt ion 
 Nondescript is a web tool designed to aid a user in revising their message until it is 
sufficiently anonymized, relevant to their provided writing sample and a randomly changing 
background corpus. Nondescript is designed to be publicly available on the web, as is the code 
behind it (Davis, 2016). 
The user inputs a writing sample of at least 7,000 words in the left field, as in Fig. 1. On the 
right, the user inputs the message they want to anonymize. Once the user clicks “Submit,” the features 
of the sample and message are analyzed in relation to each other and to the background corpus.  
The background corpus can be provided by a user who downloads the Nondescript source 
code and revises the sources.py file. The background corpus, as will be described in detail below, is 
what the user’s submitted writing sample and message will be compared to in the simulated 
authorship attribution scenario. For the purposes of testing Nondescript for this thesis, the 
background corpus is a subset of the Blog Authorship Corpus (Schler, Koppel, Argamon, & 
Pennebaker, 2006). The corpus comprises a large web crawl of Blogger.com blogs collected in 
August 2004, totaling 19,320 authors who range in age from 13 to 47. The blogs are unformatted 
plain text, with the exception of <date> and <post> tags and the token “urllink” to denote a 
location where a link used to be. Within this corpus, there are a wide range of topics and writing 
styles, from technical discussions about computer programming to intensely personal narratives. The 
only issue encountered in using this corpus was that it dates from 2004, so neologisms created since 
then would not be in that data set, and topics touching on then-current events may be quite dated. 
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However, for Nondescript’s classification function, only the top 1,000 most frequent words are 
considered, leaving most, though not all, context-bound words out of the equation.   
 
Fig. 1 — Screenshot of Nondescript’s input screen 
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Fig. 2 — Screenshot of Nondescript’s output 
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For Nondescript’s first step, three cosine similarity scores are calculated between the user-
provided sample and message, based on the top 100, 1,000, and 10,000 most frequent words in the 
background corpus. Samples and messages that are highly similar will score in the 0.8–0.9 range. 
Dissimilar documents may score 0.4–0.6.  
Next, comparison documents are selected and the Naïve Bayes classifier is trained and used 
for prediction (see Fig. 3). Seven other authors from the background corpus are randomly selected 
for comparison. (Seven is a somewhat arbitrary number, chosen to simulate a small- to medium-
sized group of authors someone would want to compare in an authorship attribution scenario.) The 
authors from the background corpus are randomly selected each time the user uses Nondescript; 
random selection each time simulates a new potential authorship attribution environment, which 
would be unpredictable for the user. Moreover, randomizing the background corpus each time 
Nondescript is used avoids giving the user a chance to overfit their revisions to the same set of 
random authors. Each random author is assumed to have a single long document in the background 
corpus, from which four non-consecutive, 7,000-word chunks of writing are set aside, forming two 
documents for training and two documents for testing for each author. All documents, including the 
user’s sample and message, are converted to arrays of term frequencies for the vocabulary of 1,000 
words. This vocabulary of the 1,000 most frequently used words (unstemmed) in the background 
corpus is a deliberately small vocabulary, chosen so that the classifier might strike a balance between 
being too naïve and too influenced by the genre of writing. That is, relying only on function words 
can result in somewhat accurate classifiers, but this is too limiting; on the other hand, allowing all 
words encountered to enter the vocabulary makes the classifier is too sensitive to topic rather than 
to style. That may be acceptable in some classification situations, but for a general-use web tool, 
neutralizing genre makes the tool more usable. The vocabulary derived from the Blog Authorship 
Corpus is included in the code for Nondescript. This vocabulary begins with the most common 
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words a, the, I, to and ends with Thursday, Chinese, George, soul. (The name “George” is likely more 
frequent in the background corpus than in contemporary writings, admittedly, due to news events 
pertaining to then-U.S. President George Bush.) 
The classifier is trained on the sample and the 14 other documents, then is used to predict 
the author of the message and of the other 14 documents (see Fig. 3 for diagram). The classifier 
score is provided (e.g., 0.83 accuracy if 83% of documents are accurately attributed). The user likely 
only cares whether their document is anonymized, so a simple sentence toggle displays on the 
output screen, either “Message is still attributed to you by this classifier” or “Message successfully 
anonymized for this classifier.” Term frequency array conversion and classification are both done 
using the Sci-kit Learn Python library (Pedregosa et al., 2011). 
 
Fig 3. Diagram of classifier with user sample, user message, authors and documents from the background corpus, and 
resulting predictions 
 
For the next step, the user’s writing style undergoes a simple stylometric analysis: How does 
their message’s average word length compare to their sample’s average word length? What about 
average sentence length? How do those two measures compare to the background corpus, overall? 
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These numbers are achieved by a simple mean and presented as a percentage, e.g., “Your sentences 
are 1.98x longer than average, compared to the background corpus.” Furthermore, term frequencies 
are compared between the user’s submissions and the rest of the background corpus. The 5 most 
unusually frequent words are displayed, e.g., compared to the average document, “‘after’ is 6.46x 
more frequent (used 12 times).” These statistics only display for words used at least twice.  
Lastly, because Nondescript is designed to be used iteratively, the page includes editable text 
fields so the user can revise their message. Revision happens in the tabbed text box in the bottom 
half of the page. Because this classifier (like many) relies on word frequencies to attribute authorship, 
the user is encouraged to find different words to express their message. Synonyms for some words 
are found through WordNet (Miller, 1995), and these synonym suggestions are included 
parenthetically, e.g., “MUCH (a lot, lots, very much).” This appears in the first tab, entitled “Revise 
manually.” The second tab, titled “I’m feeling fortuitous,” chooses synonyms at random for some 
words. Part of speech, tense, number, tone, and other more complex nuances of language are not 
considered here. As a result, though many of these synonyms may make sense (e.g., “immediately” 
replacing “directly”), some synonym replacements may result in interesting but unhelpful word 
replacement (e.g., “ternary” replacing “three”). For these first two tabs, word replacement is filtered 
using a Python library and an additional set of words to avoid offensive language substituted for 
innocuous words (Kazemi, 2016). The final tab, “Message as submitted,” is merely a copy of the 
message the user submitted. The text output in all three tabs is editable, and the user may revise the 
text field of their choice and re-submit it to see if their scores improve. That is, on resubmission, 
Nondescript re-analyzes and re-classifies the revised message. (The original writing sample remains 
the same.) The output will appear in the same window, with new metrics, having undergone another 
round of classification with seven other randomly chosen authors. The user can continue to revise 
their message iteratively. 
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Behind the web form interface, Python scripts are handling the classification tasks within the 
Flask framework. Data is passed to and from the web form through Flask. A classifier file, created 
by the Sci-kit Learn library, is saved in the same directory as the scripts. 
 
3.2 Caveat 
 In no way does Nondescript guarantee that a user’s message will be truly anonymized. Even 
if a message deceives the classifier, it may only be “anonymous” within the context of the seven 
other writers randomly chosen in that instance. Submitting the same exact message may result in 
different scores, as the random background corpus could make classification easier or harder purely 
by chance, since Nondescript merely offers a simulation of an authorship attribution scenario. 
 
3.3 Examples o f  synonym suggest ion 
 To illustrate how Nondescript suggests synonyms, a snippet of text with synonym 
suggestions is below. This snippet also comes from the Blog Authorship Corpus. (Upper- and 
lowercase is unconsidered.) 
Original message:  
Looks like the US Attourney's office wised up and nixed the subpoenas on the people who attended a protest 
rally back in November.  The part of the story that strikes me as quite possibly the funniest thing I've heard all 
week, is that they were going after members of the National Lawyer's Guild.  And they thought nobody would 
raise a fuss?  Have they ever met lawyers?  Especially with the gaggle of civil liberty lawyers that annually come 
out of Drake University's law school?  How dumb was that?!  At least they wised up.  Gotta give them a tiny bit 
of credit on that one.  But just a tiny bit. 
 
“I’m feeling fortuitous” message with randomly chosen synonyms:  
looks like the us attourney's FEDERAL AGENCY wised up and nixed the subpoenas on the HOI POLLOI 
who ASSIST a OBJECTION rally back in november. the part of the FLOOR that strikes me as RATHER 
possibly the RUMMY thing i've GET WORD all week, is that they were going AFTERWARD MEMBER of 
the national lawyer's guild. and they thought nobody would raise a fuss? have they E'ER met lawyers? especially 
with the gaggle of civil liberty lawyers that annually come out of drake university's PRACTICE OF LAW 
school? how DULL was that?! at least they wised up. gotta give them a tiny bit of credit on that one. but just a 
tiny bit. 
 
“Revise manually” message with synonym suggestions in parentheses: 
looks like the us attourney's OFFICE (agency, federal agency, government agency, bureau, authority, function, 
part, role, power, office staff) wised up and nixed the subpoenas on the PEOPLE (multitude, masses, mass, hoi 
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polloi, the great unwashed) who ATTENDED (go to, take care, look, see, serve, attend to, wait on, assist, 
hang, advert, pay heed, give ear, accompanied) a PROTEST (objection, dissent, resist) rally back in november. 
the part of the STORY (narration, tale, floor, level, storey, history, account, chronicle, report, news report, 
write up) that strikes me as QUITE (quite a, quite an) possibly the FUNNIEST (comic, comical, funny, 
laughable, mirthful, risible, curious, odd, peculiar, queer, rum, rummy, singular, fishy, shady, suspect) thing i've 
HEARD (learn, get word, get wind, pick up, find out, get a line, discover, see, try, listen, take heed) all week, is 
that they were going AFTER (later, afterwards, afterward, later on) MEMBERS (fellow member, extremity, 
appendage) of the national lawyer's guild. and they thought nobody would raise a fuss? have they EVER 
(always, e'er) met lawyers? especially with the gaggle of civil liberty lawyers that annually come out of drake 
university's LAW (natural law, law of nature, legal philosophy, practice of law) school? how DUMB (dim, dull, 
obtuse, slow, speechless) was that?! at least they wised up. gotta give them a tiny bit of credit on that one. but 
just a tiny bit. 
 
 
4. Results  
The web tool functions as expected and allows the user to iterate message revision as much 
as desired. Page display is consistent. Data transfer between the user interface and Python scripts is 
stable. Every iteration involves text transformation, training the classifier, and using the classifier to 
predict authorship; the tool takes just under one minute to complete all of this, which may be slower 
than expected compared to other web apps.  
To test the classifier and whether the synonym suggestions were worthwhile, 40 documents 
of at least 50,000 words from the Blog Authorship Corpus were used. (These documents were not 
included in the background corpus.) Three-fourths of each document served as the writing sample, 
and one-fourth as the message. Each document was run through the classifier five times against 
seven random authors in the background corpus. Then the message underwent random synonym-
replacement (the “I’m feeling fortuitous” option) and run through the classifier five times once 
more.  
The classifier’s overall accuracy score was 76.5%.  
 original 
message 
message with synonym-
replacement 
correctly attributed 99 70 
incorrectly attributed 101 130 
 
Table. Count of classified messages 
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Chart. Classifier accuracy (in percentages). 
Of the 200 times an original message was classified, the classifier was correct 99 times 
(49.5%). Of the 200 times a synonym-replacement message was classified, the classifier was correct 
70 times (35.0%). Though the classifier accuracy for the original messages was low compared to the 
overall classifier score (but still substantially better than random chance), a McNemar’s test 
determined that the synonym-replacement message was misclassified significantly more often 
compared to the original message (χ2 = 5.26, p = .022).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Nondescript is ready to be deployed as a web tool. The background corpus can be swapped 
out for another set of known-author documents; this capability allows Nondescript to be 
repurposed for use within specific genres. The code is freely available online (Davis, 2016). 
Based on the results for random synonym-replacement, computer-assisted anonymization 
appears to be a somewhat fruitful avenue. The automatic word-replacement that Nondescript offers 
does significantly lower authorship attribution accuracy. But automatic word-replacement alone 
results in text that loses some of its meaning, as the algorithm does not consider features like tense 
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and word-sense, since this is computationally expensive. Meaning can be best preserved through 
human mediation. Thus a human-directed, computer-assisted approach is more likely to retain 
meaning while deceiving a classifier. 
 
6. Future work 
This project did not perform any testing with human subjects, but a major component of 
Nondescript is human-directed revision. A user study will follow. 
In addition, the classifier does not perform cross-validation, which would add more valuable 
information about classifier accuracy.   
The classifier used is limited only to term frequency for a 1,000-word vocabulary — this is a 
relatively restricted feature set compared to other authorship attribution techniques. While this does 
bring focus to the importance of word usage, as attested by other studies, a more realistic and 
interesting approach would include more features.  
Further work could also introduce genre-specific anonymization features. In a de-
anonymization scenario, investigators would probably pool very similar documents into a corpus, 
and genre-specific words may be of great use. Nondescript is a genre-neutral tool, designed for a 
general web audience; the background corpus can be swapped out for a genre-specific one, though 
this requires a fair amount of time on the user’s part to prepare the corpus. A built-in feature that 
allows the user to compare their writing to other authors who write in the same genre would be 
more telling about their writing style in context.  
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